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 THE DEMAND FOR TAX RETURN PREPARATION
 SERVICES
 Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Michael A. Udell, and Louis L. Wilde*
 Abstract-We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation
 services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid prepar-
 ers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among
 other things, we find significant differences in the factors
 which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and
 are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these
 factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of
 IRS penalties.
 I. Introduction
 r IHE IRS has estimated that 44.2% of the
 individual returns filed in 1979 were self-pre-
 pared, and that these returns accounted for 22.8%
 of detected noncompliance. Returns prepared
 with third party assistance accounted for 55.8%
 of filings and 77.2% of the detected noncompli-
 ance. Among returns prepared with third party
 assistance, however, only 16.7% used what we
 call here a "tax practitioner" (public accountant
 or attorney) yet these returns accounted for 42.7%
 of underreported tax, 28.5% used other paid pre-
 parers accounting for 30.8% of underreported
 tax, and the remaining 10.6% used nonpaid assis-
 tance accounting for 3.7% of underreported tax.1
 A detailed breakdown of the distribution of
 preparation modes for 1979 and the associated
 proportions of tax noncompliance are reported in
 table 1.
 Economic theory has only recently focused on
 the demand for third party assistance and its role
 in tax compliance. Scotchmer (1989), emphasizing
 the informational aspects of third party ass'is-
 tance, suggests that if risk neutral taxpayers are
 not sure of their true taxable income, they will
 tend to overreport their tax- liability because the
 cost of underreporting exceeds the cost of overre-
 porting due to IRS penalties. In her models,
 taxpayers hire the services of informed third par-
 ties who reduce or eliminate uncertainty, and
 thereby lower the amount of reported tax liabil-
 ity.
 Reinganum and Wilde (1991) analyze a game
 theoretic model of taxpayer, tax practitioner, and
 IRS behavior that focuses on the service aspects
 of third party assistance. They characterize four
 types of equilibria, depending on whether taxpay-
 ers prefer'to use tax practitioners and whether
 the IRS prefers them to use tax practitioners.
 When tax practitioner penalties for noncompli-
 ance are sufficiently low and the efficiency gains
 from using practitioners are sufficiently high, the
 IRS prefers taxpayers to prepare' their own re-
 turns, but taxpayers prefer to use a tax practi-
 tioner. In this case, the use of a tax practitioner is
 associated with lower compliance and higher au-
 dit rates.
 Finally, Mazur and Nagin (1987), emphasizing
 the strategic aspects of third party assistance,
 observe that many paid preparers are "not just
 passive scribes whose function is limited to reliev-
 ing their clients of the mechanical requirements
 of return preparation. To varying degrees they
 provide information on legal requirements and
 the penalties for their breach, develop strategies
 for reducing tax liability, provide counsel on the
 risks of executing such strategies and inform
 clients of topical enforcement priorities."
 Most empirical analyses of the demand for
 third party assistance have estimated the effects
 of types of income, other return characteristics,
 and various socio-economic factors on the choice
 between self-preparation and all forms of third
 party assistance. Using a variety of data sources
 including surveys (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984;
 Collins, Milliron and Toy, 1988; Hite, 1987),
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 CPAs and attorneys are automatically able to represent
 clients before the IRS. Other paid preparers may provide
 these services only after passing a written exam sponsored by
 the IRS, and fulfilling certain continuing education require-
 ments. Because most public accountants meet these require-
 ments, we include them in the tax practitioner category.
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 - TABLE 1.-NUMBER OF RETURNS, FREQUENCY, AND PROPORTION OF
 NONCOMPLIANCE BY PREPARATION MODE FOR 1979a
 Total Returns Filed  Proportion of
 Mode of Preparation Number Frequency Noncompliance
 Self 39959000 0.442 0.228
 Non-Paid
 IRS assistedb 1265686 0.014 0.004
 Other Non-Paidc 8317320 0.092 0.033
 Paid Preparers
 National Tax Service 8588600 0.095 0.054
 Local Tax Service 10488000 0.116 0.132
 Other Paid 6690000 -0.074 0.122
 Practitioners
 Public Accountant d 5605200 0.062 0.102
 CPA! 6057200 0.067 0.258
 Attorney and CPA 3435450 0.038 0.067
 Total 90406000 1.000 1.000
 a Source: Special Academic Research File of the 1979 Individual Return TCMP.
 b The IRS Assistance category consists of three services. They are IRS Advice, with a population frequency of
 0.011; IRS Prepared, with a population frequency of 0.001; and IRS Reviewed, with a population frequency of
 0.004.
 The other nonpaid category usually consists of a family member who helps prepare the return. We have
 combined in this category all VITA prepared returns. VITA is an acronym for Volunteer Income Tax Assistance,
 which consists of unpaid volunteers who prepare returns after receiving limited instruction, typically from the IRS.
 d Public Accountants are licensed at the state level with requirements varying by state. Only four states, North
 Carolina, Virginia, Kansas, and Wyoming do not regulate Public Accountants. National Tax Services, which in
 1979 consisted entirely of H & R Block and Beneficial Financial' Services Co., and Local Tax Services often provide
 their own training, but do not require employees to be Public Accountants.
 eCPA'is an abbreviation for Certified Public Accountant.
 TCMP data (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1989;
 Erard, 1990), and the IRS Master File (Long and-
 Caudill, 1987) researchers have found that the
 demand for third party assistance increases with
 amounts of total or complex income, age, return
 complexity, tax rates, the number of dependents,
 and self-employment, and decreases with the level
 of education.
 A complete characterization of the impact of
 third parties on tax compliance would include
 analyses of taxpayer choices of the kind of third
 party assistance, the effect of third parties on tax
 compliance, and the IRS posture towards returns
 completed by third parties. We begin this ex-
 panded characterization by analyzing taxpayers'
 choices among 12 modes of third party assistance,
 using nested logit techniques applied to aggregate
 data from the Special Academic Research File of
 the 1979 Individual Return Taxpayer Compliance
 Measurement Program (TCMP). Although the
 best data on third party assistance released to
 date by the IRS, this data file limits the analysis
 to 696 aggregated observations from 12 IRS audit
 classes and 58 IRS districts.2
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II
 presents an econometric specification of the de-
 -mand for tax preparation services. Section III
 describes the data we use and models we esti-
 mate. Section IV presents our results and conclu-
 sions.
 II. A Model of Paid Preparer Selection
 We group types of return preparers according
 to natural patterns of substitutability. One group
 consists of CPAs, attorneys, and public accoun-
 tants, which we label "practitioners," most of
 whom are licensed to represent taxpayers before
 the IRS. The second group consists of national
 tax services, local tax services, and -other paid
 preparers who generally are not able to represent
 their clients before the IRS. The third group
 consists of third party assistors who are free of
 charge. A final group consists of self-preparers.
 We account for this pattern of substitutability in
 our estimation by using a two-stage nested multi-
 nomial logit model.3
 First we estimate taxpayer choices among the
 four broad categories: practitioners, paid prepar-
 2 For precise definitions of IRS audits classes as well as
 recent estimates of overall noncompliance see IRS (1990).
 For a detailed discussion of the nested logit model see
 McFadden (1978).
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 ers, nonpaid preparers, and self-preparation.
 Then we estimate taxpayers' choices between the
 modes of assistance within each category.4 Let
 i = 1,..., I index the preparation category, and
 let j = 1,2,..., Ji index the specific assistance
 modes within category i. We assume that the
 probability that an individual chooses alternative
 ij, Pi, can be written as the product of the condi-
 tional probability Pjli and marginal probability Pi
 with each probability in the multinomial logit
 form
 pili = E?Z 1e0lix (1
 e aY+ OiIi
 P i aYiii (2)
 Here X and Y are vectors of observed attributes
 which vary by audit class and IRS district and Il
 is the expected maximum utility (or inclusive
 value) a taxpayer derives from alternatives in the
 ith category with
 Ji
 Ii= logE efliX. (3)
 j=1
 The unknown parameters in this model are Bjli,
 ai, and Oi with the latter being a measure of the
 dissimilarity of alternatives in the ith category.5
 Since our data are aggregated to the IRS dis-
 trict level, we estimate Pjii and Pi using an aggre-
 gate form of the nested logit model.6 Specifically,
 we form the log odds for equations (1) and (2) as
 log[ j' ] = VL X v j 1, (4)
 and
 P^[i1 =>^t +nt _ra-I, v fi * 1.
 Estimation of equations (4) and (5) requires esti-
 mates of the choice probabilities for which we use
 the observed selection frequencies and measures
 of X and Y for which we use group weighted
 averages. Denote the probability that an individ-
 ual in the kth IRS district chooses alternative ij
 as pik. Let the number of cases in the kth IRS
 district be Nk and denote the frequency of occur-
 rences of alternative ij in district k as F,j. Sup-
 pressing the superscript k we can write
 log I ] I = 1j3LX + Aiii, (6) Ft11
 and
 log -F] = a'Y + Oi(Ii - I) + ,i (7)
 with
 ,ili = logL - log L
 and
 = log[j -log[].
 Straightforward calculations show that
 E(Ajli)= 0
 1 1 1
 V(Ajli) = N p + p | for j 1, (8)
 1
 cov(Aj1i' i ZL=i) NP for j + 1, (9)
 and that
 E(Ai) = 0,
 V j+ )for] j+1, (10)
 1
 cov(Q1,uj,1) = NP for 1. (11)
 Since Pij varies with the alternative and N varies
 with the size of each audit class and IRS district,
 equations (8) and (10) present a classic form of
 4Alternative patterns of substitutability are considered by
 Udell (1991).
 5McFadden (1978) proves that if 6' lies in the closed inter-
 val [0,1] the resultant nested logit is consistent with random
 utility maximization.
 6 The estimation of nested logit models has to date relied
 exclusively on individual level data. We extend the nested
 logit method for use with aggregate data following Berkson
 (1944) and Theil (1969). Implicit in this development is the
 assumption of homogeneity of individuals within the aggrega-
 tion classes. For a discussion of the robustness properties of
 logit techniques when applied to aggregate data, see also
 Allenby and Rossi (1991).
 7Our data set has an average of 70 individuals per cell.
 Monte Carlo evidence reported in Domencich and McFadden
 (1975) shows that when cell sizes are large (over 30 observa-
 tions) the Berkson-Theil estimator of equations (6) and (7)
 has very small sample bias (see table 5.1, p. 113).
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 heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, a nonzero co-
 variance is also present (equations (9) and (11))
 since the log odds equations (6) and (7) use
 common comparison groups. Minimum chi-square
 estimation of the nested logit model corrects si-
 multaneously for this covariance structure.
 III. Model Specification
 The TCMP program involves line-by-line au-
 dits of approximately 50,000 randomly chosen
 individual tax returns. Our data file aggregates
 the results of the 1979 TCMP audits by IRS
 district and audit class. Six audit classes comprise
 returns where income was not derived principally
 from farm or sole-proprietorship activities, three
 others where income was derived principally from
 sole-proprietorships, and a final three where in-
 come was derived principally from farm activities.
 For every line for each audit class in each of the
 districts, taxpayers' reported amounts are
 recorded as well as the adjusted amounts recom-
 mended by the TCMP audit. For the 1979 TCMP,
 additional information was recorded on the 12
 return preparation modes used by taxpayers. To
 avoid districts with too few observations, we com-
 bine all attorneys into a single category and as-
 sign the following mnemonics to the resulting
 practitioner alternatives:
 PA = Public Accountant
 AIT = Attorney, or Attorney and CPA
 CPA = Certified Public Accountant.
 The three paid-preparer alternatives are
 LTS = Local Tax Service
 OPP = Other Paid Preparer
 NTS = National Tax Service.
 Finally, we combine several nonpaid assistance
 alternatives and assign the following mnemonics:
 IRS = IRS prepared, IRS reviewed,
 or IRS assisted
 ONP = Volunteer Income Tax Assistance,
 or Other Nonpaid Preparers
 SELF = Self-prepared.
 As discussed in the Introduction, three basic
 motives for taxpayers to use third-party assistance
 have been identified; information (Scotchmer);
 service (Reinganum and Wilde); and strategic
 (Mazur and Nagin). Our choice of explanatory
 variables parallels these motives. In particular, we
 assume that the probability of choosing any mode
 of third party assistance or self-preparation is a
 function of the IRS audit rate (AUDIT), the
 frequency of penalties (PENALTY), the percent-
 age of the adult population with a high school
 education (EDUCATE), the percentage of the
 adult population over 65 years old (AGE65),
 state, local,- and real-estate tax deductions
 (TAXDED), other deductions (OTHDED), the
 number of exemptions (EXEMPT), the sum of
 wage, interest, and dividend income (SIMPLE),
 the sum of schedule C gross receipts and partner-
 ship income (BUSINESS), other income
 (OTHINC), and the number of forms included
 with the taxpayer's return (FORMS).
 Although we make no attempt to test one
 against another, our predictions regarding the
 effects of the explanatory variables on the de-
 mand for third party assistance are based on the
 service, information, and strategic motives. We
 next summarize our general expectations regard-
 ing the effects of the explanatory variables on the
 demand for third party assistance with occasional
 reference to specific motives.
 Since neither nonpaid nor paid preparers gen-
 erally can represent clients before the IRS, in-
 creases in the IRS enforcement activity variables
 RATE or PENALTY should increase the demand
 for practitioners.8 Because more educated tax-
 payers are better able to prepare their own re-
 turns, represent themselves before the, IRS, de-
 termine their own- true tax liability, and engage in
 appropriately strategic behavior, increases in
 EDUCATE should reduce the demand for all
 modes of third party assistance and increase self-..
 preparation. An increase in AGE65 may possibly
 increase the demand for preparers and practi-
 tioners based on the service and information mo-
 tives.9
 Our tax return variables reflect the TCMP. ad-
 justed levels for three basic components of the
 tax calculation: income, deductions, and exemp-
 tions.'0 We use three measures of income; the
 sum of wages, interest, and dividends, the sum of
 schedule C gross receipts and partnership in-
 8 The audit rate is based on audits accomplished data pro-
 vided by the Examination Division of the IRS. The frequency
 of penalties is obtained directly from the aggregated TCMP
 data file.
 9 The percentage of the adult population with a high school
 education and the percentage of the adult population over
 age 65 are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
 for the year 1979.
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 FIGURE 1.-CHOICE OF TAX RETURN PREPARATION SERVICES
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 come, and all other income. Increases in
 SIMPLE should decrease the demand for third
 party assistance and increase self-preparation,
 since for taxpayers with predominately wage, in-
 terest, or dividend income, there is less need for
 service or information, less opportunity for strate-
 gic behavior and little likelihood of IRS enforce-
 ment attention. Increases in BUSINESS should
 increase the demand for practitioners since own-
 ers of small businesses do face substantial IRS
 enforcement attention, considerable complexity,
 and may as a normal business practice require
 the services of attorneys or highly qualified ac-
 countants. We have no a priori expectations with
 respect to the effect of increases in OTHINC on
 the demand for third party assistance and self-
 preparation, but include it in our specification in
 order to account for all income.
 We divide deductions into state, local, and real
 estate taxes and other deductions. Since taxpay-
 ers who pay state and local taxes may be subject
 to state enforcement attention as well as IRS
 enforcement attention, increases in TAXDED
 may increase the demand for practitioners.1" Un-
 like state, local, and real estate taxes which are
 not likely to be contested, other deductions often
 are contested. This suggests that increases in
 OTHDED should also increase the demand for
 practitioners. By our definition, EXEMPT pri-
 marily measures family size. To the extent that
 larger families have greater demand for tax ser-
 vices, an increase in EXEMPT should increase
 the demand for both preparers and practi-
 tioners." Finally, the number of forms is a
 straightforward measure of return complexity and
 as such increases in FORMS should increase the
 demand for both preparers and practitioners.
 IV. Results and Conclusions
 The choice of third party assistance is esti-
 mated in two stages, as discussed in section II
 and illustrated in figure 1. Table 2 presents the
 elasticities of the unconditional choice probabili-
 ties Pij with respect to the underlying explana-
 tory variables.13
 Our results generally are consistent with our
 expectations. Increases in the IRS audit rate or
 frequency of penalties increase significantly the
 demand for practitioners. For the audit rate this
 effect is limited to CPAs, but for the frequency of
 penalties the effect applies to all three types of
 practitioners. For the audit rate, this increase
 comes at the expense of national tax services
 while for the frequency of penalties it comes
 largely at the expense of self-preparation.
 1 The TCMP provides not only what the tax return re-
 ported amounts were, but what the IRS believed the true
 amount to be. We use the corrected amounts of deductions
 and exemptions as meaningful measures of the true amounts
 of these items.
 11 See Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989) for a discussion of
 the relationship between state and federal enforcement activ-
 ity.
 12 We subtract exemptions for over 65 years of age and
 blindness from total exemptions. The remainder is a measure
 of the number of persons supported by the taxpayer.
 13 These elasticities are based on sequential estimation of
 the nested logit model, which includes the estimation of the
 dissimilarity parameters as discussed in section II. These
 parameters are 0.28, 0.85, and 1.4 for nonpaid preparers, paid
 preparers, and practitioners, respectively. The last of these is
 not significantly different from 1. The calculation of the elas-
 ticities is complicated by the fact that each explanatory vari-
 able has a distinct affect on all alternatives at each level of the
 nested logit tree. The mean values of all variables and a
 discussion of their units is available on request. Further
 details concerning the data base, the estimation method and
 calculation of the elasticities are available in Udell (1991).
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 TABLE 2.-RESPONSE ELASTICITIES OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES BY MODE OF PREPARATION
 Nonpaid Preparers Paid Preparers
 Mode IRS ONP LTS OP NTS
 CONSTANT 0.695 4.625 -1.742 -0.762 -1.640
 (0.845) (8.468) (- 2.290) (- 0.967) (- 2.098)
 RATE -0.573 0.266 0.254 -0.214 -0.787
 (- 1.899) (1.331) (0.724) (- 0.600) (- 2.209)
 PENALTY -0.187 0.040 -0.005 0.136 0.054
 (-0.836) (0.333) (-0.100) (1.875) (0.769)
 EDUCATE -0.840 -3.119 0.484 -0.051 1.123
 (-1.439) (-8.611) (1.192) (-0.118) (2.631)
 AGE65 0.081 -0.542 -0.205 -0.584 -0.267
 (0.293) (- 3.098) (- 1.545) (- 3.442) (- 1.757)
 TAXDED 0.108 0.039 -0.175 0.073 -0.196
 (0.560) (0.400) (- 2.707) (1.061) (- 2.707)
 OTHDED -0.355 -0.007 0.206 -0.169 -0.065
 (-'1.575) (-0.062) (2.758) (-2.038) (-0.791)
 EXEMPT -0.968 -1.587 1.087 1.240 1.345
 (- 2.257) ( 6.650) (6.308) (6.382) (6.925)
 SIMPLE -0.108 -0.362 -0.240 -0.317 -0.280
 (-0.552) (-3.155) ((-3.964) (-4..352) (-3.919)
 BUSINESS -0.077 -0.249 0.012 0.016 0.027
 (- 0.220) (- 0.721) (0.257) (0.332) (0.518)
 OTHINC 0.069 -0.108 -0.056 -0.053 0.003
 (0.343) (-0.658) (-1.008) (-0.882) (0.054)
 FORMS -0.048 0.301 0.481 0.237 0.083
 (- 0.075) (0.904) (2.609) (1.152) (0.399)
 Practitioners Self-prepared
 Mode PA ATT' CPA Self
 CONSTANT -3.810 -5.583 -3.863 1.751
 (- 4.830) (- 6.745) (- 5.015) (4.730)
 RATE 0.228 0.160 0.443 -0.015
 (1.176) (0.788) (2.326) (- 0.111)
 PENALTY 0.363 0.244 0.490 -0.182
 (5.535) (2.992) (8.065) (- 5.869)
 EDUCATE -0.163 0.647 -0.391 0.274
 (-0.460) (1.586) (- 1.182) (1.659)
 AGE65 0.722 0.887 0.331 0.081
 (4.301) (4.410) (2.142) (1.416)
 TAXDED 0.180 0.195 0.137 -0.005
 (4.883) (5.124) (4.098) (- 0.209)
 OTHDED -0.34 0.198 0.390 -0.068
 (- 0.483) (2.679) (5.847) (- 2.471)
 EXEMPT 1.445 1.249 1.006 -0.937
 (7.583) (5.654) (5.663) (- 12.680)
 SIMPLE -0.267 -0.371 -0.179 0.345
 (- 4.229) (- 5.366) (- 3.146) (12.397)
 BUSINESS 0.085 0.068 0.104 -0.001
 (1.861) (1.395) (2.319) (-0.003)
 OTHINC -0.029 -0.021 -0.023 0.049
 (-0.588) (-0.378) (-0.497) (1.303)
 FORMS 0.611 1.342 1.098 -0.624
 (3.952) (7.944) (7.574) (- 6.526)
 Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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 As predicted, an increase in the percentage of
 the adult population with a high school education
 increases self-preparation. However, it does not
 decrease the demand for all forms of third party
 assistance. In particular, other nonpaid preparer
 shows a statistically significant fall in demand,
 and the demand for national tax services actually
 shows a significant increase. An increase in the
 percentage of the adult population over age 65
 increases the demand for practitioners and de-
 creases the demand for paid preparers.
 Some of our strongest results are obtained with
 respect to tax return variables. Increases in wages,
 interest, and dividends significantly decrease the
 demand for all forms of third party assistance
 except IRS assistance, and very significantly in-
 crease self-preparation. Increases in schedule C
 gross receipts and partnership income, as ex-
 pected, increase the demand for practitioners and
 have no significant effect on any other particular
 mode of preparation including self-preparation.
 Finally, an increase in other income, perhaps
 surprisingly, has no statistically significant effect
 on any form of third party assistance or self-pre-
 parations.
 With respect to deductions, an increase in state,
 local, or real estate taxes significantly increases
 the demand for practitioners. However, it actu-
 ally decreases the demand for local and national
 tax services, an effect which' we did not expect.
 Among all the explanatory variables, the number
 of exemptions has the strongest effects; increases
 in it significantly decrease self-preparation and
 increase the demand for all forms of paid third
 party assistance. It also significantly decreases the
 demand for nonpaid preparers. Finally, the num-
 ber of forms also has a pattern of effects con-
 sistent with our expectations; increases in the
 number of forms increase the demand for practi-
 tioners, decrease self-preparation, and have little
 effect on the demand for other modes of third
 party assistance.
 These results' generally confirm the results ob-
 tained by other investigators. However, in many
 cases we find significant differences between the'
 effect of explanatory variables on paid-preparers
 as compared to practitioners. In particular, many
 of the results obtained in previous studies which
 differentiate only between self-preparation and
 all forms of third party assistance seem to be
 driven by the demand for practitioners. We also
 have obtained new results regarding the effect of
 audit rates and the frequency of penalties on the
 demand for third party assistance. These results
 will be particularly important when we turn to the
 effects of third party assistance on noncompli-
 ance. Nevertheless some of our results must be
 viewed as preliminary. In particular, while our
 results with respect to the percentage of the adult
 population over 65 and the number of exemp-
 tions conform to our expectations, better data
 and further investigations are needed fully to
 understand the relationship between' these vari-
 ables and the demand for third party assistance.
 Even at this early stage, we can, however, spec-
 ulate on the change in noncompliance induced by
 a shift in return preparation. For example, con-
 sider a change in information reporting which has
 the effect of increasing the amount of simple
 income relative to other forms of income. In this
 case, we would predict an increase in self-pre-
 paration. If the level of noncompliance at-
 tributable to self-prepared returns does not
 change, then a net reduction in noncompliance
 would result. However, since the choice of a type
 of tax return preparation may itself be condi-
 tioned on the level of tax evasion, consistent
 determination of the levels of noncompliance at-
 tributable to specific preparer types must take
 account of 'the potential for self-selection bias.
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